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APPELLANT'S REPLY
In their Opposition to Plaintiff's Opening Brief, defendants argue that
Idaho has adopted the common law, and that the common law "prohibits continuation of
a personal ittjury action upon the death of a plaintiff." Defendants further contend this
appeal is "frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation" and request attorney's fees
and costs.
REPLY ARGUMENT
Plaintiff agrees with defendants that Idaho has adopted the common law,
unless abrogated by statute, and the issue presented has not been addressed by the Idaho
legislature. Plaintiff disputes defendants' contention that the common law provides that
in actions arising ex delicto, a plaintiff's claim for both non-economic and economic
damages abate.
Although plaintiff has agreed with defendants that the common law in
Idaho presently holds that claims for non-economic damages for such things as pain and
suffering abate, the common law in Idaho is unclear regarding claims for economic
damages in such circumstances.
Defendants concede that had plaintiff been married, her claim for
economic damages would not have abated. Plaintiff's position is that "the community" is
the same as "the estate" of the deceased Leeann Craig.
IDAHO LAW
In the point that follows it will be explained how the United States
Supreme Court got all the state Courts off track by creating the belief that wrongful death
and survival statutes were needed to override the common laws.
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This statute, when enacted, created a new cause of action
that did not exist at common law. Whitley v. Spokane Ry.
Co., 23 Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913); See also, Gavica v.
Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980); Hughes v.
Hudelson, 67 Idaho 10, 169 P.2d 712 (1946). Thus, the
right of a person to recover for the wrongful death of
another is statutory, and a person seeking to recover must
qualify under the statute. Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130
P.2d 859 (1942) * * * Our legislature wished to change the
common law to allow recovery for wrongful death, while at
the same time limiting that recovery ...." - Everett v.
Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 789-90, 673 P.2d 387, 389-90
(1983)

***

Except for this statute, no such action could be prosecuted
in this state and no such cause of action could accrue in
this state. Webster 1 v. Norwegian Mining Co., 137 Cal.
399, 70 Pac. 276, 92 Am. St. Rep. 181; Burk:2 v. Arcata,
etc., R.R. Co., 125 Cal. 364, 57 Pac. 1065, 73 Am. St. Rep.
52; Munro v. P. C. D. & B. Co., 84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303,
18 Am. St. Rep. 248. - Whitley v. Spokane Ry. Co., 23
Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913)

Whitley affirmed a wrongful death judgment for Mary Elizabeth Whitley,
the mother of A. P. Whitley who was killed near Coeur d'Alene while a passenger on
Defendant's railroad. A. P. Whitley left a wife but no children and the railroad settled
1

Webster (decided in 1902) held that a personal representative could not bring a wrongful death

claim if there were no heirs, "if there are no heirs there can be no damage" - "At connnon law
no such right of action existed."
2

Burk (decided in 1899) remanded a wrongful death jury verdict of$1500 for the brothers and

sisters of an married man because "The English courts held that only pecuniary loss could be
recovered" and the plaintiffs had not shown any damage - "The majority of men die without
much property'' -

but that "The suit could have been maintained by the administrator for the

benefit of the estate."
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with his wife. Under Idaho law at that time the mother was also an heir. The Whitley
court spoke of there being no wrongful death action "Except for this statute" but did not
discuss the common law. 132 Pac at 123, 126.

POINT TWO
FAULTY IDSTORICAL PREMISE
Many early court decisions in Idaho -

and even some more recent ones

have perpetrated an erroneous belief that injury and negligence actions were

extinguished upon the death of either the victim or the tortfeasor. Unfortunately, the
United States Supreme Court played a big part in this misstatement of the common law
and it took many decades to reverse. It the meantime there became a big body of law in
the states that unfortunately lead to the dismissal of injury actions when the victim or
tortfeasor died.
To the extent Idaho law and the law of most states adopted the common
law of England, the most important error to recognize -

is that defense claims that an

action did not exist at common law or did not survive the death of the victim -

are

invalid; the right to bring or continue an action is not in fact dependent upon a statute
based on the belief that it was creating something that did not exist at common law.
Every state has a wrongful death statute.
In enacting these laws state legislators believed they were creating causes
of action where none had existed at common law. Lawyers and courts have, therefore,
often stated they had little choice but to defer to the legislature, parties to litigation "must
take the bitter with the sweet." Arnettv. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134,154 (1974) (plurality
opinion, per Rehnquist, J.).
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That assumption is wrong. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized 27
years ago in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 379,389 n.2 (1970), actions
for wrongful death were, in fact, cognizable at common law, and in the American
colonies, if not always in England.
Historical research has proven that wrongful death statutes limit common
law rights and do not bestow new rights. Thus, those statutes must be regarded as
violating state constitutional guarantees, particularly the right to a certain or complete
remedy. This is so regardless of a state legislature's ostensibly generous impulses or
putatively good intentions.
Origin of Confusion

The confusion regarding the common law origins of wrongful death
actions came from Lord Ellenborough's 1808 pronouncement that there was no tort action
at common law for the death of a human being, made in Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493,
170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (nisi prius 1808) ("in a civil court, the death of a human being cannot
be complained of as an injury").
That statement was not only "obviously unjust" but also inaccurate and
"technically unsound," as "based upon a misreading of legal history. "3
Felony - Merger Doctrine

The basis for the supposed absence of wrongful death actions at common
law as the English felony-merger doctrine. Under this rule, common law courts routinely
held that private suits for damages for an act that was also a felony were not tenable. The
courts reasoned that because a civil tort against a private person was less important than a

3

3 William Searle Holdsworth, History ofEnglish Law 336 (3d ed. 1927)
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criminal offense against the Crown, the tort or "merged" into the felony.
The doctrine found practical justification in the fact that wrongful death
suits would never be filed because felons not only lost their lives but also forfeited all
property to the Crown, rendering them effectively judgment-proof. Thus, after the crime
had been punished, nothing remained of the tortfeasors' property on which to base a
viable lawsuit.

Recovery Theories
However, even before the Norman Conquest in 1066, English courts had
recognized that the accidental killing of a human being was a compensable wrong.4
Indeed, far from being disenfranchised or disfavored at early English law, wrongful death
claimants could sue under an assortment of legal theories throughout the Middle Ages.
The "wer," the "wite," "the compromise," and the "appeal of murder" were all
conventional causes of action by which the deceased's family could obtain compensation
at ancient common law.
For example, the wer and wite were reparations paid to the deceased's
family and the Crown, respectively, in amounts based on the deceased's status or rank. 5
The compromise was similar to an action for damages. 6 The "criminal appeal" was not

4

1 Frederick Pollock & Frederick William Maitland, The History ofEnglish Law 48 (2d ed.

1898)
' See generally, Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17
STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1043, 1055 (1965)
6

See generally George E. Woodbine, "The Origins of the Action of
Trespass," 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL 799,803 (1924)
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an appeal as we know it. It was a criminal proceeding that a private person initiated to
punish homicide, and it was used more often than an indictment for that
purpose.
The unintended side effects of the felony-merger rule may have made it
often futile to seek compensation from the tortfeasor-felon. But it is wrong to equate the
lack of an incentive to sue with the absence of a legal right to do so. Given both the
confounding nature of Lord Ellenborough's ruling and its conflict with prior common law
practice, some English judges have questioned whether his ruling was accurately
reported. 7
The decision was a nisi prius ruling, meaning that it arose in a local less
formal county trial conducted by a single judge. Not in the more formal context ofthe
court sitting en bane at Westminster. Lord Ellenborough gave no reason for, and cited no
precedent or other authority in support of his assertion.

In Colonial America
In any event, the American colonies won independence from England
before Baker v. Bolton was announced by Lord Ellenborough as the state of British law
circa 1808. More important, his conclusion was contrary to the practice that was followed
by American courts before the Revolution and was based on early principles never
adopted by the colonies.
Not surprisingly, one leading constitutional scholar discovered that there is
"no observation in colonial statutes or decisions lending any support to a belief that a

7

See, e.g., Osborn v. Gillett, 8 L.R. 8 Exch. 88, 96 (1873) (Bramwell, B., dissenting)
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death claim would have been denied by our colonial ancestors."

8

As Justice Joseph Story, one of the principal expositors of early U.S. law,
emphasized, although "our ancestors brought with them [the] general principles [of the
common law] and claimed it as their birthright; ... they brought with them and adopted
only that portion which was applicable to their situation." Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet.
137, 144 (1829).

Colonial Compensation
1n reality, the colonial practice required a person who had been convicted
of homicide to compensate the victim's family -

a form of a wrongful death action. 9

For example, in 1675, a Massachusetts Bay Colony court found a civil defendant liable
for having "accidentally discharg[ed] guns at foules on ye neck thereby wounding
Samuel Fflacks son so he died." The court ruled the tortfeasor should pay £10 to the boy's
father. 10
Numerous other 19th-century U.S. decisions during the 1800's permitted
common law wrongful death actions. 11 For example, in 1825, a federal district court
8

Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1043, note 10,

at 1065-66 (emphases added) (1965)
9

Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17
STANFORDLAWREVIEW 1043, 1062-65 (1965)

10

1l

1 Mass. Ct. Assts. 54-$5 (1675)

Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90, 92 (Conn. 1794) death of a wife three hours after surgery to

remove a breast and breast tumor; it rejected the defense contention that the civil claim was
barred by the felony-merger rule of England: "The rule urged by the defendant, is applicable, in
England only .... "); see also Piscatauqua Bank v. Turnley, 1 Miles 312,316 (Phila. Dist. Ct.
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justified its holding that a wrongful death action could be maintained in admiralty on the
ground that the felony-merger rule had "never been adopted in this state" and was
"entirely in opposition to the system of civil polity established in this country."

12

Other States Reject Felony-Merger

In 1854, the Supreme Court of Georgia held the felony-merger rule was no
bar to a wrongful death action caused by negligence or other noncriminal acts. Shields v.

Yonge, 15 Ga. 349, 355-56 (1854). The leading antebellum text on the law of domestic
relations in the early 1800's made clear that the felony-merger doctrine was irrelevant in
the United States. 13 As one commentator correctly concluded,
Ellenborough's blunt announcement that no civil action can
be grounded upon the death of a human being not only
lacked historical support at the time but was consistently
ignored in America until 1848 (and even later by the
English courts), and during this forty-year interval [from
1808 to 1848) there was no instance ofa denial ofcivil

action for wrongful death. 14

How Things Got off Track
In Carey v. Berkshire Railroad, 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848), that U.S.

1836); Fordv. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838); James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, 16364 (1853); Kake v. Horton, 2 Haw. 209, 212-13 (1860); Sullivan v. Union Pac. R. Co., 23 F. Cas.
368, 371 (No. 13,599) (C.C. Neb. 1874)
12

Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894, 895-96 (No. 11,234) (D. Me. 1825), dismissed on appeal for

lack of admiralty jurisdiction, 19 F. Cas. 891 (No. 11,233) (C.C. D. Me. 1827)
13

Reeves, Domestic Relations 377 (Am. ed. 1816)

14

See generally, Wex S. Malone, "The Genesis of Wrongful Death," 17
STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1043, 1067 (1965) (Emphasis added)
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court decreed that no cause of action for wrongful death had existed at common law.

Carey relied entirely on Baker v. Bolton. Other courts followed, citing Carey and Baker,
even though the underlying felony-merger doctrine continued to be universally rejected
by U.S. courts as having no application in this country.
State wrongful death statutes were adopted in response to Carey and its
progeny.
Nonetheless, the myth that there was no common law action for wrongful
death, and that legislatures accordingly have a free hand in establishing -

and restricting

wrongful death recoveries, created the perverse situation that: "From the defendant's

point of view it [is] cheaper to kill a person than to scratch him. "15
Other scholars termed the rule "barbarous" 16 and concluded that "no
satisfactory reason for the rule has ever been suggested." 17 Indeed, a legal system that
fully compensated even minor injuries while providing inadequate recovery for the
ultimate personal injury--death--would seem to exemplify the very kind of arbitrariness
condemned by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases such as the recent Romer

v. Evans. 26

Moragne decision
The U.S. Supreme Court aimed to level this topsy-turvy landscape. In

Moragne, it expressly overruled its 1886 decision in The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199
(1886), and held that the general maritime Jaw-one of the few areas of judge-made

15

Prosser and Keeton, the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984)

16

Frederick Pollock, Law of Torts 55 (Landon ed., 1951 ).

17

Francis Buchanan Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act §12 (2d ed. 1913).
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federal common law - did afford a cause of action for wrongful death. 398 U.S. 375
(1970).
The Court based its ruling in large part on its reevaluation of both English
and American legal history. Pointedly, that reassessment revealed that "the historical
justification marshaled for the [felony-merger] rule in England never existed in this
country." 398 U.S. at 384. As the Court explained, the absence of wrongful death suits
"in primitive English legal history ... was based on a particular set of factors that had,
[even in 1886], long since been thrown into discard even in England, and that had never
existed in this country at all." 398 U.S. at 381. The Supreme Court stated:

"The first explicit statement of the common-law rule
against recovery for wrongful death came in the opinion of
Lord Ellenborough, sitting at nisi prius, in Baker v. Bolton,
1 Camp 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). That opinion did
not cite authority, or give supporting reasoning, or refer to
the felony-merger doctrine in announcing that "in a civil
court, the death of a human being could not be complained
of as an injury."
Following Moragne, several state courts have recognized that wrongful
death actions are properly regarded as having their genesis in common law rights, not
legislative largesse. Chief among those courts has been the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, whose erroneous 1848 decision in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad, 55 Mass.
(1 Cush.) 475, 476-77 (1848) marked the first time a U.S. court embraced Lord
Ellenborough's characterization of the common law and denied a widow the right to
recover for the wrongful death of her husband holding it was only "an offense against the
crown" and because it was a felony the felony "prevails over the wrong done to the
master, and his action by that is gone*

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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maintained, it must be upon some established principle of the common law [but at
common law] the death of a human being is not the ground of an action for damages."
Carey started an erroneous trend that continued for decades.

In 1972, two years after Moragne was decided, Massachusetts's high court
expressly overruled Carey, observing that
Upon consideration of the Moragne decision and the sound
reasoning upon which it is based, we are convinced that the
law in this Commonwealth has also evolved to the point
where it may now be held that the right to recovery for
wrongful death is of common law origin, and we so hold. *
* * Consequently, our wrongful death statutes will no
longer be regarded as "creating the right" to recovery for
wrongful death. Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229
(Mass. I 972)

Six years later, the Illinois Supreme Court described the view that
wrongful death actions are wholly statutory in nature as "a much criticized concept
stemming from questionable antecedents." Wilbon v. D.F. Bast Co., 382 N.E.2d 784, 790

(Ill. 1978).
The following year, the Supreme Court of Alaska in Haakanson v.
Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 n.11 (Alaska 1979) explained that it did

not find that state's wrongful death statute to be in derogation of the common law,
because "if there were no statute, we would in all probability follow the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in Moragne." 18

In 1984, the Supreme Court of Alaska again rejected the proposition that
wrongful death statutes are in derogation of the common law and therefore should be
18

Haakanson v. Wakefield Seqfoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 n.11

(Alaska I 979)
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construed strictly. Hanenbuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'!, 694 P.2d 143, 145-46 (Alaska
1984):

In rejecting the application of the discovery rule in
wrongful death actions, these cases proceed from the
assumption that wrongful death is an exclusively statutory
creation. Thus, as an integral part of the statute creating the
action, a period of limitations has been imposed which is a
condition of the right of action. [citations omitted]. The
underlying reasoning is that wrongful death actions are
created by statute in derogation of the common law and
thus should be construed strictly. * * * We disagree with
these cases, both in their characterization of the underlying
assumptions of wrongful death actions and I their
interpretation of the statutory language. 694 P.2d at 145-46

Similarly, in 1985, the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that "it
appears ... that reliance on Baker as the basis for lack of recovery at common law may
be misplaced." Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 716 (Ariz. 1985). The
court held that wrongful death "statute and precedent have combined to produce a cause
of action with common law attributes." Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712,
718 (Ariz. 1985). The court explained that even if the Arizona legislature had "believed
that it was creating a new statutory right of action in enacting the Wrongful Death Acts,"
there was "no evidence to suggest that [the legislature] intended to occupy the field
completely, thus leaving no room for future judicial initiative." Summerfield v. Superior
Court, 698 P.2d 712, 717 (Ariz. 1985). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS A.§925, cmt. k

(1979).
Stare decisis is no bar

To be sure, other courts have declined to follow Moragne, usually citing
considerations of stare decisis and the longstanding nature of state wrongful death
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statutes. 19 But plaintiffs seeking to challenge the continued vitality--and constitutional
legitimacy--of statutory limitations on conuuon law wrongful death claims ought not be
deterred by either factor. After all, neither one impeded the Moragne Court from
overruling an 84-year-old precedent.
Indeed, neither stare decisis nor the mere passage of years provides
sufficient justification for perpetuating Baker's inequitable results. The fact that it took
more than 150 years for scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court to correct Lord
Ellenborough's errors is no reason why other courts should continue to replicate his (or
perhaps his scribe's) mistakes.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of stare decisis should not stand as an insuperable shield
against correcting injustice. As the U.S. Supreme Court recently explained, "Stare decisis
is not an inexorable .conuuand; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision."'

20

Automatic allegiance to dogma is particularly inappropriate where, as in
this area,

* state constitutional rights and not mere statutory interpretations
are at issue;21

19

See, e.g., Ecker v. Town of West Hartford, 530 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Conn. 1987);

Sullivan v. Carlisle, 851 S.W.2d 510,516 (Mo. 1993); Moreno v. Sterling Drug,
Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348,356 n.7 (Tex. 1990)
20

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (citations omitted)

21

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,828 (1991); See generally United States v.
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* the sort of reliance interests that exist in cases involving
property and contract rights are not present;22

* relatively few courts have squarely addressed the issues or
carefully surveyed the relevant history; 23 and

* new facts, specifically those about the customs observed by
colonial American courts, have been uncovered. 24
Moreover, the common law has always been regarded as the special
domain of the courts and been subject to judicial modification when society's needs
dictate change. There is no legitimate reason for the courts to refrain from correcting
judicial error and from returning to the proper historical understanding of wrongful death

Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 699 (1964); Smith v. Al/wright, 321 U.S. 649,665 (1944);
Rutan v. Republican Party ofIllinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 2756 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
22

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. See generally Swift & Co. v. Wickham,
382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 265 U.S. 4 72
(1924); The Genesee Chiefv. Fitzhugh, 13 L. Ed. 1058 (1852)

23

See generally Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (1993), citing

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483,493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Since none of our prior holdings is on
point, the doctrine of stare decisis is not controlling." (citation omitted)).
24

See generally Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 558 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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actions under the common law.
If wrongful death suits are recognized as arising under the common law
and not as being solely statutory in origin, then statutorily proscribed recoveries should
be viewed not as a matter of legislative grace--as creating a remedy where none has
existed before--but rather as caps on damages.
In cases outside the wrongful death category, courts in many jurisdictions
have invalidated damages caps and other restrictions on who can sue, when, and why.
Courts have condemned these limitations as arbitrary measures that violate state
constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, the right to jury trial, and the right to
a complete and certain remedy. Courts have also condemned these limitations as
legislative remittiturs that invade the province of the judiciary, contrary to the separation
of powers principle.
The defense premise for dismissal of this action is the erroneous reliance
on the Steele case and the erroneously perpetuated belief that a victim's injury claim
expired with his death or the death of the tortfeasor. That, however, is not a valid basis
under Idaho law or common law.
With respect to defendants' claim for fees and costs, plaintiff respectfully requests
that it be denied, since this appeal is not "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation."
Given the manifest injustice of the rule promoted by the defendants and supported by the
lower court, coupled with the lack of precedent on the issue, this action is brought in
good faith and attorney's fees are not warranted should this court side with defendants.
There is sufficient ambiguity in the common law that, coupled with the manifest injustice
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in the outcome in the lower court and the lack of controlling statute, this appeal is
justified for express clarification of the law on the issue presented.
Plaintiff respectfully asks this Court for relief from the unjust consequences of the
rule advocated by defendants and asks for express clarification of the common law in
Idaho on the issue presented.

Dated:
PAUL T. CURTIS
Attorney for Appellant Leeann Craig

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

16

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of June, 2009, two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF were served upon the following attorneys of record by
the method indicated:

Jennifer K. Brizee
TOLMAN, BRIZEE & MARTENS, P.C.
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1276

[X ]US Mail, postage pre-paid
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile (232-2499)
[ ] Overnight Mail

Paul T. Curtis

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

17

